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Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war
Abstract
A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon motivation and those
that are built upon feasibility. We analyze a comprehensive global sample of civil wars for the period
1965-2004 and subject the results to a range of robustness tests. The data constitute a substantial
advance on previous work. We find that variables that are close proxies for feasibility have powerful
consequences for the risk of a civil war. Our results substantiate the 'feasibility hypothesis' that where
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A key distinction among theories of civil war is between those that are built upon 
motivation and those that are built upon feasibility. We analyze a comprehensive 
global sample of civil wars for the period 1965-2004 and subject the results to a range 
of robustness tests. The data constitute a substantial advance on previous work. We 
find that variables that are close proxies for feasibility have powerful consequences 
for the risk of a civil war. Our results substantiate the 'feasibility hypothesis' that 





Over the past half-century civil war has replaced international war as the most 
prevalent form of large-scale violence. Once started, civil wars are hard to stop: they 
persist for more than ten times as long as international wars. Their consequences are 
usually dire, being massively destructive to the economy, to the society, and to life 
itself. The prevention of civil war is therefore rightly seen as one of the key priorities 
for international attention. Informed strategies of prevention must rest upon an 
analysis of what makes situations prone to civil war. Precisely because in any 
particular violent conflict the issue is highly politicized, with supporters off each side 
proffering a litany of self-serving ‘explanations’, the public discourse is hopelessly 
contaminated by advocacy. The issue is thus particularly well-suited to statistical 
analysis of global data. This approach both abstracts from any particular conflict and 
subjects the researcher to the discipline of statistical method.     
 
This approach to establishing the factors which make a country prone to civil war was 
pioneered in Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004). Since those papers, the literature, the 
data, and our own thinking have all advanced considerably. In the present paper we 
revisit the issue, replicating, overturning, and extending our earlier results.    
 
The foundation for serious quantitative analysis of civil war was laid by political 
scientists at the University of Michigan, the university that pioneered much 
quantitative political analysis, who carefully built a comprehensive global data set on 
civil wars, the Correlates of War Project (COW). Using this data set, its variants and 
now its rivals, economists and political scientists have begun to analyze the factors 
that might account for the onset of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). Quantitative analysis based 
on global data sets has its own severe limitations imposed by data constraints and so 
should be seen as complementing qualitative in-country research rather than 
supplanting it. As data constraints are periodically relaxed so opportunities for better 
quantitative analysis are opened. The present paper uses such an opportunity, aspiring 
to be definitive conditional upon the recent quantum expansion in data, both for the 
dependent and independent variables, in respect of quality, quantity and timeliness. 
One reason for a quantum expansion in the data for our analysis is an artefact of our 
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dependent variable: the risk of civil war during a five-year period. Our previous 
analysis closed in December 1999 and we are now able to include a further five years. 
Since 2000 there has been a shift towards international intervention, notably the 
United Nations policy of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002) and 
the replacement of the Organization of African Unity, with its principle of ‘non-
interference’, by the African Union with its principle of ‘non-indifference’. These 
shifts in sentiment were reflected in an increase in the number of settlements of civil 
war that was sufficiently dramatic to suggest a significant break with past behaviour. 
Hence, it is of particular interest to investigate whether there was a corresponding 
significant change in the incidence of civil war onsets. There have also been striking 
advances in the quantification of potential explanatory variables. These enable us to 
investigate a new range of social and political variables. Using the technique of 
stepwise deletion of insignificant variables we arrive at a provisional core regression 
in which all terms are significant. We then conduct specification tests to ensure that 
no additional significant variable can be added. The resulting regression has a 
reasonable claim to be the best characterization of the data. Since we adopted this 
same approach in our previous study, albeit on substantially inferior data, a 
comparison of our results from the two studies provides some indication of how 
robust the present results are likely to prove to further inevitable improvements and 
innovations in data sets.  
 
Our own thinking on proneness to civil war has also evolved. As implied by the title 
‘greed and grievance’, our previous paper was still rooted in the traditional focus on 
the motivation for rebellion. Since then our work has increasingly called into question 
whether motivation is as important as past emphasis upon it had implied (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2007). Instead of the circumstances which generate a rebellion being 
distinctive in terms of motivation, they might be distinctive in the sheer financial and 
military feasibility of rebellion. We have formulated this into the ‘feasibility 
hypothesis’: that where a rebellion is feasible it will occur. While in this paper the 
spirit of our empirical analysis is to provide a comprehensive investigation of the 
factors that make a country prone to civil war rather than to test a single hypothesis, 




In Section 2 we set out the theoretical framework for our analysis. By combining 
motivation and opportunity, our framework encompasses a range of political science 
analyses which stress various types of motivation, and economic analyses some of 
which focus on motives while others focus on opportunities. In Section 3 we discuss 
the data, focusing upon the major expansions and revisions since our previous article. 
In Section 4 we report our results. Although our previous results are broadly 
confirmed, we find three new variables to be significant. Not only are these three 
variables important in their own right, they provide a somewhat firmer basis for 
discriminating between theories. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the 
implications for policy towards promoting civil peace. 
 
2. The Economic Theory of Civil War 
 
Just as the quantitative study of civil war has evolved rapidly, so has its analysis using 
standard applications of economic theory1. Whereas traditional political analyses 
either assumed or asserted some particular ‘root cause’ of civil war, usually traced to a 
historical grievance, modern economic theory focuses on the feasibility of rebellion as 
well as its motivation. The defining feature of a civil war is large scale organized 
violence on the part of a rebel army. This is not meant to imply that the rebel side is 
‘to blame’, but rather that since virtually all governments maintain standing armies, 
the distinctive feature of civil war is the existence of a non-government army. In most 
circumstances the establishment of a rebel army would be both prohibitively 
expensive and extremely dangerous regardless of its agenda. The relatively rare 
circumstances in which rebellion is financially and militarily feasible are therefore 
likely to constitute an important part of any explanation of civil war. Hirshleifer 
(2001), who pioneered much of the analytic research on conflict, proposed the 
Machiavelli Theorem, that no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused. 
Our variant of this theorem, the feasibility hypothesis, proposes that where rebellion is 
materially feasible it will occur. This can be expressed as the following, empirically 
testable hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
1 The survey in the Handbook of Defense Economics provides a fuller discussion of this new literature 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2007). 
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Hypothesis: Factors that are important for the financial and militarily feasibility of 
rebellion but are unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war. 
 
The feasibility hypothesis leaves the motivation of the rebel group unspecified, its 
initial agenda being determined by the preferences of the social entrepreneur leading 
whichever organization is the first to occupy the niche. Sometimes this will be a not-
for-profit organization with a political or religious agenda, and sometimes a for-profit 
organization. Where the niche is sufficiently large several rebel groups may coexist, 
but the factors that explain the initial rebel agendas are incidental to the explanation of 
civil war. Weinstein (2005) provides an interesting extension: rather than motivation 
being orthogonal to the feasibility of civil war it may be determined by it. He shows 
that regardless of the initial agenda, where there is manifest scope for loot-seeking 
self-selection of recruits will gradually transform the rebel organization into one 
motivated by loot-seeking.  
 
The two most obvious material conditions for rebellion are financial and military. A 
rebel army is hugely more expensive than a political party and faces far more acute 
organizational difficulties of raising voluntary contributions from within the country. 
For example, the Tamil Tigers, a relatively small rebel group in the small developing 
country of Sri Lanka, is estimated to spend between $200m and $350m per year, an 
amount equal to between 20 per cent and 34 per cent of the GDP of Northeast Sri 
Lanka, the zone it controls and for which it seeks political secession (see Strategic 
Foresight Group, 2006). In Britain, the leading opposition political party, unusually 
well-funded because it is pro-business, spends around $50m per year (see 
Conservative Party of Great-Britain, 2005), or about 0.002 per cent of GDP. The 
Tamil Tigers are far short of being the best-funded rebel group in the world: their 
scale of funding is probably fairly normal for a rebel group, and the Conservative 
Party is far from being at the impecunious end of the distribution of opposition 
political parties. Yet the Tamil Tigers are commanding resources at least 10,000 times 
greater as a share of GDP than one of the world’s major political opposition parties. 
More generally, a rebellion cannot be regarded as a natural evolution from, or 
alternative to, political protest: it requires a quantum difference in financial resources. 
Often a rebellion will simply be beyond the financial means of those groups 
politically opposed to the government. Similarly, in most states rebellion is not 
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militarily feasible: the government has effective localized control of its entire 
territory. Financial and military viability are evidently interdependent: conditional 
upon the efficacy of government security there is some minimum military scale of 
rebellion which is capable of survival, and this determines the height of the financial 
hurdle that must be surmounted by an organization that aspires to rebellion. Viability 
is likely to be assisted by some combination of a geography that provides safe havens 
and an ineffective state.  
 
This account can be contrasted with the more traditional grievance-based explanation 
which proposes that objective social exclusion explains civil war. However, the 
grievance-based account is itself only a subset of accounts based on motivation. While 
for purposes of propaganda rebel leaders are indeed likely to explain their motivation 
in terms of grievances, other plausible motivations for organized private violence 
would include predation and sadism. Indeed, since the typical civil war lasts for many 
years and rebel victories are rare, if rebellion is rational motivations are likely to 
reflect benefits during conflict, rather than prospective benefits consequent upon a 
victory which must be heavily discounted both by time and risk. Further, if the 
rebellion is rationally motivated it is more likely to be due to benefits that accrue to 
the rebel leadership itself, rather than to the attainment of social justice for a wider 
group: social justice is a public good and so faces acute collective action problems. 
Even if these collective action problems could be overcome, during civil war civilian 
suffering is very widespread so that the social groups that rebel leaders claim to be 
fighting for are likely to lose heavily: rebellion is far more likely to deliver 
devastation than justice. This opens a further motive-based account of civil war: 
rebellions may be due to mistakes, or they may even be non-rational. The former 
possibility has been developed in theories analogous to the winner’s curse of auction 
theory: rebellions occur due to military over-optimism. The latter has not been 
explored formally, but there is evidence that several rebel leaders have shown signs of 
irrationality. Based on the examples of Bosnia and Rwanda, Mueller (2004) suggests 
that leaders whip up hatred and recruit ‘fanatics, criminals and hooligans’ to commit 
most of the violence. A further likely example of irrationality is the Ugandan Lord’s 
Resistance Army whose leader claims to fight for the rights of the Acholi ethnic group 
in Northern Uganda. This rebel organisation has killed and kidnapped many members 
of its own ethnic group. With its only stated goal being the establishment of rule by 
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the Ten Commandments, it may be more closely analogous to freak religious groups 
such as Waco and Jonestown than to organizations of political opposition.  
An implication of the wide range of possible explanations for rebellion is that the 
factors which potentially cause it cannot be restricted a priori to a narrow range of 
proxies for grievance. Our approach is rather to find proxies for each of the three 
major perspectives: feasibility, and the two main variants of motivation, greed and 
grievance. In practice, due to the limitations of data that are available globally for 
several decades, some concepts can only be proxied by variables that have more than 
one possible interpretation. This was, unfortunately, the case with our previous 
results. In the present analysis we introduce three new variables that have less 
ambiguous interpretations and so enable us to distinguish more readily between 
feasibility and motivation. 
  
3. Data and Method 
 
We examine how likely it is for a country to experience an outbreak of civil war. War 
starts are coded as a binary variable and we analyze this risk by using logit 
regressions.  The risk of a war start is examined in five year periods, from 1965-1969 
until 2000-2004. If a war breaks out during the five year period we code this as a one 
and zero if the country remained peaceful. We code ongoing war observations as 
missing because we do not want to conflate the analysis of war initiation with the 
analysis of its duration. Previous research indicates that the duration of a civil war is 
determined by different factors from their onset (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 
2004). In order to code civil war starts we used data provided by Kristian Gleditsch 
(2004), who has carefully updated the correlates of war (COW) project (Small and 
Singer, 1982, and Singer and Small, 1994).2 An advantage of using this data set is that 
it is an update of the data used in our previous work (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) 
which makes comparisons between the previous and new results relatively 
straightforward. We perform robustness checks on an alternative new data set. Our 
analysis potentially includes 208 countries and 84 civil war outbreaks. We list these 
wars in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
2 Gleditsch (2004) only lists wars until 2002. For the years 2003 and 2004 we used the ‘Armed Conflict 
Dataset’ (ACD) by Gleditsch et al (2002). 
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--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
The COW definition of civil wars is based on four main characteristics. It requires 
that there is organized military action and that at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted in a 
given year.3 In order to distinguish wars from genocides, massacres and pogroms 
there has to be effective resistance; at least five percent of the deaths have been 
inflicted by the weaker party. A further requirement is that the national government at 
the time was actively involved. Our alternative measure of civil war, which we use for 
robustness checks, is based on the ‘Armed Conflict Dataset’ (ACD) by Nils Petter 
Gleditsch et al (2002). Their definition has two main dimensions. First, they 
distinguish four types of violent conflicts according to the participants and location: 
(1) extra-systemic conflicts (essentially colonial or imperialist wars), (2) interstate 
wars, (3) intrastate wars and (4) internationalized intrastate wars. The second 
dimension defines the level of violence. Minor conflicts produce more than 25 battle 
related deaths per year, intermediate conflicts produce more than 25 battle related 
deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1,000 battle related deaths and 
lastly wars are conflicts which result in more than 1,000 battle related deaths per year. 
We coded civil wars as all armed conflicts except interstate wars, dating the war start 
for the first year when the violence level was coded as war, and the end as the first 
year when the armed conflict did not generate any deaths. 
 
There are a large number of factors that may determine what makes a country more 
prone to a civil war. While we do not consider idiosyncratic characteristics for 
individual countries, such as trigger events and leadership, we have collected a wide 
variety of economic, political, sociological, geographic and historical variables for our 
global cross-country panel. We present the summary statistics in Table 2 and list the 
data sources in the Appendix.  
 
--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
                                                 
3 However, the COW researchers made adjustments for long conflicts. For some major armed conflicts 
the number of battle deaths dropped below the 1,000 threshold but since the country was not at ‘peace’ 
the war is coded as ongoing. Without these adjustments many war countries would have multiple 
conflict spells rather than one long conflict. 
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We start with a comprehensive model of factors that potentially influence the risk of 
rebellion. The theoretical and empirical justifications for considering these factors are 
discussed below. We then delete stepwise the variables that are not significant to end 
up with our core model described in Table 3, column 4. We have tested different ways 
of excluding variables to avoid issues of path dependency. The following key 
variables are included in the initial model. In what follows we briefly present the 
variables and their expected sign. A more extensive discussion of all variables will 
follow in the results section.  
 
In our initial model we include the following economic variables. 
 
Ln GDP per Capita: This is a difficult variable to interpret since it is correlated with 
many omitted variables. There is also a potential problem of reverse causality since a 
high risk of rebellion will depress income. With these caveats there are two reasons to 
expect that low per capita income would directly increase the risk of rebellion: the 
opportunity cost of rebellion is lower, and the state is likely to have less control over 
its territory.  
 
Growth of GDP per Capita: This again raises serious problems of endogeneity. 
However, the expectation is that the faster the rate of growth the lower the risk of 
rebellion. For example, the faster is growth the tighter will be the labour market and 
so the more difficult will it be for the rebel organization to recruit. Miguel, Satyanath 
and Sergenti (2004) were able to address endogeneity through instrumenting growth 
with rainfall shocks and found that it indeed substantially reduced risks.  
 
Primary Commodity Exports (PCE): Natural resources can increase the risk of 
rebellion because they constitute easy sources of rebel finance. This may both directly 
motivate rebellion and make rebellions that are motivated by other considerations 
more feasible. They can also sever the government from the need to tax citizens and 
hence indirectly produce a government that is not accountable, thereby increasing the 
grounds for grievance. The previous empirical evidence on natural resources is 
ambiguous. In our earlier work (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) we found that the 
relationship between natural resources and conflict takes the form of an inverted U-
shape. We suggested that this arose because if the government had very large resource 
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revenues it could afford to buy off all of its opponents so that beyond some point 
additional revenue was risk-reducing. Fearon (2005) agrees that resource revenues 
increase the risk of rebellion but argues that the relationship is log-linear rather than 
quadratic. Other studies, such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasise the effect of oil 
rather than of natural resources in general. We use the quadratic formulation for our 
initial model, but check the robustness of our results with respect to points raised by 
other studies.  
 
Country studies of civil war invariably trace the onset of rebellion to some historical 
roots and so historical conditions should be expected to matter for the risk of conflict. 
We investigate the following: 
 
Post Cold War: The impact of this variable on the conflict risk is controversial. While 
Kaplan (1994) predicted that the fall of the iron curtain would increase the number of  
conflicts, Gleditsch et al (2002) argue the contrary. Thus, a priori the sign of this 
variable is ambiguous. 
 
Previous War: We analyze the effect of previous civil war through two variables 
which need to be considered jointly: a dummy variable for the occurrence of a 
previous civil war and a continuous variable which measures the number of months 
since the previous war ended (‘peace’). The dummy variable controls for any fixed 
effects that might have precipitated the initial war and also make the country prone to 
further wars. Having controlled for such effects, the continous variable measuring the 
time since the previous war, proxies legacy effects which might be expected gradually 
to fade. These might be psychological, such as hatreds or a sense of ‘never again’, 
material, such as stocks of weapons, and organizational, notably the rebel army. In 
principle the sign is ambiguous.  
 
Former French African Colony: A security guarantee from an outside regime for the 
government in power can reduce the incentives for rebellion. The only nation that 
provided a de facto security guarantee to some of its former colonies was France 
between 1965 and 1999. We shall accordingly expect this dummy variable to reduce 
the scope for conflict. 
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The composition of the society is also commonly invoked as an explanation for 
conflict. We therefore include: 
 
Social Fractionalisation: The impact of ethnic and religious social cleavages on the 
risk of conflict has been controversial in the literature (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 
2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Different forms of fractionalisation have previously 
been found to increase, reduce or not affect the scope for conflict. Therefore, we do 
not a priori expect a particular sign for this variable. In the main analysis we include a 
variable of social fractionalisation that captures various forms of cleavages. The exact 
definition of this variable is discussed in more detail further below. 
 
Proportion of Young Men: We expect this variable to increase the risk of rebellion. A 
great availability of potential recruits as rebel soldiers makes is easier and cheaper to 
start a rebellion. It may also increase the alienation of youth. 
 
Ln Population: Since our economic scale variable is per capita income, our remaining 
scale variable is population size. The key interest in this variable is not its sign, which 
is likely to be positive, but whether the marginal effects are large. If an increase in the 
population does not proportionately raise the risk of conflict this could be interpreted  
as evidence of scale economies in security. If, for example, two identical countries are 
merged with no underlying change in the risk in either place, r, then the measured risk 
of rebellion (in either location) would be r + (1-r)r and so would very nearly double. 
Thus, if the coefficient on population was such that risks increased proportionately 
this would in effect be the benchmark of size neutrality. 
 
Geography is particularly pertinent for investigating the feasibility hypothesis. In 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) we investigated both forest cover and the extent of 
mountainous terrain. The former was insignificant and is not investigated further here. 
The latter was marginally significant and was subsequently incorporated by Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) who extended the measure. We use that extended measure here.  
 
The majority of the academic work on civil war is conducted by political scientists. 
This reflects a presumption that it is at root driven by the grievance of political 





Overview and descriptive statistics 
 
Wars tend to occur in situations where data collection has already broken down and so 
there is a severe trade-off between the number of wars that can be included and the 
quality of the data on which the analysis is based. Our core regression includes 71 of 
the 84 wars and has 1063 observations for 172 countries. This sample is a 
considerable improvement on the core regression used in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
which was based on 52 wars and 688 observations. Our core sample includes some 
imputed data for social fractionalization, young men and mountains. For variables 
with missing data points we have set missing values to the mean of observed values 
and added a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if the data are missing.4 
This tests whether the assumption that missing observations are on average the same 
as actual observations is correct. When this dummy5 variable is insignificant, so that 
the assumption is accepted, the dummy is then dropped from the regression. 
Potentially data imputation can be taken further than this and in one of our robustness 
checks we use the AMELIA method of multiple random imputation of all missing 
values of explanatory variables. This enables us to include all 84 wars and 1472 
observations. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Table 1 gives an overview list of all civil wars included in the 
data set and Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables of the core 




Our core results are developed in Table 3. In the first three columns we progressively 
eliminate insignificant variables stepwise to arrive at the core model of column 4.6 
We now discuss in detail the results for the variables included in the core model. 
                                                 
4 On this treatment of missing values see Greene (2003, pp 59-60).  
5 ‘Dummy’ refers to a dichotomous variable that can only take the values of 0 or 1.  
6 This method of stepwise deletion is based on the ‘general to specific’ approach (Hendry, 1995, p 
270). More recently this method has also been used in a cross-section context (Hendry and Krolzig, 
2004). 
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 --- Table 3 about here --- 
 
The key theme of our previous analysis was that three economic characteristics drive 
proneness to civil war, namely the level, growth and structure of income. Peaceful 
observations in our data set are characterized by a per capita income that is more than 
five times higher than in countries in which wars broke out. To reduce problems of 
endogeneity we measure income at the start of each five-year period. In all columns of 
table 3 we find that the risk of a civil war during the period is significantly greater at 
lower levels of initial income. It is useful to benchmark the risk of conflict in a 
hypothetical country with characteristics set at the sample mean. The predicted risk 
for such a country is 4.6 per cent7. If the level of per capita income is halved from this 
level, the risk is increased to 5.3 per cent. The effect of the level of income is also 
found by the other major global quantitative study, Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
However, even with a five-year lag there are potentially serious concerns about 
endogeneity. When we turn to our robustness checks we address these issues, showing 
that our initial results survive once income is instrumented. 
 
Although income appears to be proxying some causal relationship, its interpretation is 
extremely difficult since it is correlated with so many other features of a society. 
Fearon and Laitin interpret it as proxying the effectiveness of the state, and thus the 
ability of the government to deter rebellion. In our previous work we interpreted it as 
proxying the opportunity cost of time and hence the cost of rebel recruitment. These 
interpretations need not be alternatives.  
 
Wars often start following growth collapses. To reduce problems of endogeneity we 
measure the growth rate of GDP per capita over the five-year period prior to that for 
which we are estimating the risk of conflict. The growth rate during the five years 
prior to conflict averages -0.5 per cent, compared to 2 per cent in peaceful countries. 
In all the columns of Table 3 growth significantly reduces the risk of conflict. Again 
at the mean of other characteristics, if the growth rate is increased by one percentage 
point, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 per cent. The effect 
                                                 
7 For readability, the marginal effects are not displayed in the tables.  
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of the growth rate of income is also found by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) 
using Africa-only data, on which they are able ingeniously to instrument for growth 
by means of rainfall. This is not a feasible option for a global sample since Africa is 
atypical in having rain-fed agriculture as a large component of GDP. Again, growth 
can be interpreted in several different ways. Our own interpretation stays with the 
issue of rebel recruitment: growth implies job creation which reduces the pool of 
labour likely to be targeted by rebels. However, growth could also be an important 
determinant of government popularity and through this influence the willingness of 
the population to support rebels, or at least not inform against them.   
 
Our final economic variable is the structure of income. We follow Sachs and Warner 
(2000) and proxy richness in natural resources by the proportion of primary 
commodity exports in GDP, measuring it at the start of each period. In all columns of 
Table 3 there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between natural resources and 
conflict, with the sign of primary commodity exports (PCE) being positive and 
significant and PCE squared being negative and significant. Since Fearon (2005) has 
argued that the relationship is log-linear rather than quadratic, we tested the log-linear 
specification against the quadratic, but found that the latter dominates: the risk of 
dependence upon primary commodity exports is at its peak when exports constitute 
around 25 per cent of GDP. Taking the extremes of 0 per cent and 25 per cent, the 
implied risks at the mean of other characteristics are 2.2 per cent and 5.0 per cent.  
 
The channels by which primary commodities might relate to the risk of conflict have 
come under intense scrutiny and debate (Ross, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Rohner, 
2006). Three channels seem likely. One is that primary commodity exports provide 
opportunities for rebel predation during conflict and so can finance the escalation and 
sustainability of rebellion. The most celebrated cases are the diamond-financed 
rebellions in Sierra Leone and Angola. Oil also provides ample opportunities for rebel 
finance, whether through ‘bunkering’ (tapping of pipelines and theft of oil), 
kidnapping and ransoming of oil workers, or extortion rackets against oil companies 
(often disguised as ‘community support’). A second channel is that rebellions may 
actually be motivated, as opposed to merely being made feasible, by the desire to 
capture the rents, either during or after conflict. A third channel is that the 
governments of resource-rich countries tend to be more remote from their populations 
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since they do not need to tax them, so that grievances are stronger (see Tilly, 1975). 
Evidently, these three channels need not be alternatives, but a study by Lujala, 
Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) helps to distinguish between them. They find that 
conflicts are more likely to be located in the areas of a country in which natural 
resources are extracted, providing some support for the rebel finance hypothesis. 
 
Two policy implications have often been drawn from our previous results on these 
three economic variables. One is that economic development is critical for reducing 
the incidence of civil war. The other is that international trade in primary commodities 
carries particular risks and so warrants special measures such as the Kimberley 
Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. As is evident from our 
above discussion, while these policies are consistent with our results they are not 
entailed by them: alternative interpretations could be found in which these would not 
be warranted. However, our present results remain consistent with these policies. 
 
Twenty-three countries experienced repeat civil wars. Either this reflects country 
fixed-effects, or conflict increases the risk of further conflict. To test the latter we 
introduced a variable for the time that has passed since the previous conflict.8 This is 
again highly significant: in all the columns of Table 3 risks decline as the duration of 
peace lengthens but the effect is very slow. A country only ten years post-conflict has 
a risk of 14.2 per cent, and one that is twenty years post-conflict has a risk of 8.6 per 
cent. To check that this is not proxying some unobserved fixed characteristic that 
makes these countries endemically prone to conflict we introduced a dummy variable 
that took the value of unity if the country had had a previous conflict (Table 3, column 
1). The variable is insignificant. The high risk of repeat conflict was one component 
of our concept of the ‘conflict trap’. Once a country stumbled into a civil war there 
was a danger that it would enter a dysfunctional cycle in which the legacy of war was 
a heightened risk of further conflict, partly because of this time effect, and partly 
because of the likely decline in income. The principle legacy of a civil war is a grossly 
heightened risk of further civil war.  
 
                                                 
8 If the country never experienced a civil war we count the years since the end of World War II. 
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We now turn to the effect of population size. In all columns of Table 3 population size 
increases the risk of civil war. However, the marginal effect is small. A doubling of 
population size increases the risk of civil war by only one fifth 20  (from 4.6 per cent 
to 5.5 per cent). The most plausible interpretation of this is that there are economies of 
scale in certain basic functions of the state, most notably the deterrence of organized 
violence.9 An implication is that controlling for other characteristics, a region that is 
divided into many countries, such as Africa, will have considerably more conflicts 
that one which is divided into only a few countries, such as South Asia. This result 
sits uneasily with the recent international fashion for settling conflicts by the creation 
of new states: Eritrea and prospectively Southern Sudan in Africa, the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in Europe, East Timor in Asia, the (now-dissolved) FARC mini-state in 
Latin America, and most recently the two Palestinian proto-states of the West Bank 
and Gaza in the Middle East. As the low-income world divides into more countries to 
settle ‘historic grievances’ there should be some presumption that unless these 
societies achieve economic development internal conflict is likely eventually to 
increase. 
 
These five variables (income, growth, natural resources, peace duration, and 
population) constitute what is common between our previous analysis and our present 
results. What is different? One difference is in respect of social composition. In our 
previous work we found that ethnic fractionalization had ambiguous effects. Risks 
were increased by what we termed ‘ethnic dominance’. By this we meant that the 
largest ethnic group constituted somewhere between 45 per cent and 90 per cent of the 
population. Other than this, we found that social and religious fractionalisation tended 
to reduce the risk of conflict. In combination this implied a quadratic effect of ethnic 
fractionalization, first increasing risk and then reducing it. With our new data we find 
a simpler relationship: social fractionalization significantly increases risk (cf. all 
columns of Table 3). We measure social fractionalization by combining two measures 
of ethnic and religious diversity. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization index measures 
the probability of two randomly picked individuals not speaking the same language. 
The religious fractionalization index is constructed in a similar way. We use a 
                                                 
9 In support of this, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) find that the effectiveness of international 
peacekeeping forces is related to their absolute size and not their size relative to population or 
economic activity. 
 18
combination of these two variables to capture the possible cross cutting of ethnic and 
religious diversity. A priori, ethnic and religious fractionalization can interact in 
various ways. If cleavages are coincident either one might be redundant. If cleavages 
are non-coincident they could be additive, with three ethnic groups and three religious 
groups generating six differentiated groups, or multiplicative, with cross-cutting 
cleavages generating nine groups. We found that the multiplicative specification 
dominated other possibilities and this is the specification adopted in our core 
regressions.10 So measured, doubling social fractionalization from 18 per cent to 36 
per cent, for example, raises the risk of conflict from 4.6 per cent to 6.67 per cent. The 
change of results from our previous analysis matters most for risk estimates in the 
most ethnically diverse societies, most notably much of Africa.  
 
Three new variables enter the core regression, surviving the stepwise deletion process 
in Table 3. The first is a dummy for being a former French colony in Africa during the 
period 1965-1999. This has a negative sign and is significant, as shown in Table 3, 
column 4. During this period analyzed the former French colonies of Africa had a risk 
of civil war that was less than a third of that which would otherwise have been 
predicted. They faced a risk of 2.6 per cent (given the estimated coefficient), while 
they would have suffered a civil war risk of 8.2 per cent if they had had the same 
characteristics, but without being Francophone. How might this have come about? 
One possibility is that the distinctive cultural and administrative traditions established 
by France have left a more peaceable legacy than those societies that were not 
colonized by France. An alternative interpretation is that during this period 
Francophone Africa remained under a French military umbrella, with French bases 
through the region providing de facto security guarantees. Since the security 
guarantees were confined to sub-Saharan Africa, partly for logistical reasons, and to a 
clearly defined period, it is possible to test between these two interpretations by 
including both a dummy variable for all countries that were former French colonies, a 
dummy variable for the Francophone sub-Saharan African countries during 1965-99, 
and a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed in more detail in our 
discussion of robustness tests, we show that it is the security interpretation which is 
                                                 
10 Potentially, this implies that if a society is homogenous with respect to either religion or ethnicity 
then the other dimension of differentiation has no effect. In practice, the only society so characterized 
in our data is Mauritania.  
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best-supported. The French policy was in striking contrast to British post-colonial 
policy which very rapidly ceased to countenance military intervention. As political 
governance gradually became more of an issue during the 1990s, French military 
intervention came to be seen as unjustified since it had involved support for tainted 
regimes (Michailof, 1993, 2005). The decisive departure from the practice of 
guarantees was when the French government decided to allow the coup d’etat in Cote 
d’Ivoire of December 1998 to stand despite being in a position to reverse it. This was 
a controversial decision taking by a new President against the advice of the civil 
service establishment whose views reflected past practice. This decision enables the 
shift in policy to be precisely dated.  
 
Paradoxically, shortly after the French government decided against further military 
intervention the British government introduced it, sending a substantial force into 
Sierra Leone to end the civil war and enforce the post-conflict peace. This British 
policy is evidently too recent and indeed to date too country-specific to warrant 
inclusion in a statistical analysis. However, we invite political scientists to construct a 
variable which rates for each country-year globally over this period the de facto 
security guarantees provided, whether from former colonists, superpowers, or military 
alliances. The introduction of such a variable into the analysis would provide a useful 
test of a widespread strategy.   
 
A second new variable that we include in our core model  is the proportion of the 
population made up of males in the age range 15-29. In our previous work this was 
insignificant but the expansion of sample and improvement in data quality bring it 
sufficiently close to significance to warrant inclusion (see Table 3, column 4). Our 
robustness checks, discussed below, also support the inclusion of this variable.A 
doubling in the proportion of the population in this category increases the risk of 
conflict from 4.6 per cent to 19.7 per cent. As with criminality, rebellion relies almost 
exclusively upon this particular segment of the population. A likely explanation for 
this extreme selectivity is that some young men have both an absolute advantage and 
a taste for violence. Some rebel groups undertake forced recruitment from among 
boys. A common tactic, employed for example by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda, was for boys to be kidnapped from schools and then required to commit an 
atrocity that made it impossible for them to return to their community. Another tactic, 
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employed for example by the Revolutionary United Forces in Sierra Leone, is to 
target young male drug addicts who can then be controlled through drug supplies.  
 
A third new variable is the proportion of the terrain of a country that is mountainous 
This is a difficult concept to measure empirically because it is not well-proxied by 
crude objective indicators such as altitude: a high plateau is not particularly 
‘mountainous’. For the measure used in our previous work we commissioned a 
specialist geographer, John Gerrard, to code terrain globally. This has since been 
extended by Fearon and Laitin, who indeed found the variable to be significant in 
their specification, and we use these extended data. In our core specification the 
variable is not quite significant (p=0.14) but we retain it, in part because of its 
intrinsic plausibility. We also find the point estimate and standard error for 
mountainous to be very stable when we subject this core model to the various 
specification and robustness checks discussed below. The effect is potentially large. 
Taking the point estimate at face value,  were Nepal flat its risk of civil war would 
have been 3.5 per cent based on its other characteristics. Given that 67.4 per cent of its 
terrain is mountainous, its risk was 7 per cent. This variable replaces our previous 
geographic variable, which measured the dispersion of the population over the 
country, which is no longer significant. 
 
In addition to the variables listed in Table 3 we also tested the significance of a 
number of other possible determinants of war risk. None of the measures of inequality 
were significant, nor were literacy rates for men, political rights, checks and balances 




How robust are these results? Our procedure of stepwise deletion risks path-
dependence and some of the variables are likely to be endogenous. Table 4 presents 
specification tests while Table 5 extends the analysis to a wider class of robustness 
checks. 
 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
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We first test the robustness of the dummy variable for Francophone Africa during 
1965-99. We add dummy variables for being a former French colony, regardless of 
region, and for being African regardless of colonial history. When all three variables 
are included (Table 4, column 1) none is significant, but the dummy variable for being 
a former French African colony has the highest z-statistics. Eliminating successively 
those of these three variables with the lowest z-statistics (see Table 4, column 2) 
leaves this as the only surviving, significant variable. Hence, the most reasonable 
interpretation is that the radically lower risk of conflict was as a result of the French 
security guarantee. 
 
In column 3 we show that the number of years since independence does not 
significantly affect the risk of conflict. In the columns 4 and 5 we show that our 
measure of social fractionalisation has a stronger impact than alternative measures of 
ethnic dominance and ethnic fractionalisation. In column 6 we show that population 
density does not significantly affect the risk of conflict. 
 
As mentioned, Fearon and Laitin (2003) have argued that what matters is not as much 
natural resources in general, but oil in particular. We therefore tested whether the 
relationship was more general than oil (Table 4, column 7). The addition of a variable 
for the value of fuel exports was insignificant, while the original specification of 
primary commodity exports and its square both remained significant.  
 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
 
In Table 5 we investigate a range of more methodological issues. In the first three 
columns of table 5 we check the robustness of the income variable. Post-conflict 
countries will tend to have lower income than other countries, due to the costly effects 
of war, and they will also tend to have higher risks of conflict, if only because of 
unobserved fixed effects. This creates the possibility that the association between low 
income and high risk is not causal. To control for this possibility we investigate a 
variant in which only ‘first time’ civil wars are included, with post-conflict countries 
dropped from the sample (Table 5, column 1). The concept of ‘first-time wars’ is 
made much easier empirically because for several decades until the wave of 
decolonisation around the start of the period covered in our analysis peace was 
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maintained through imperial rule in much of the world. With subsequent wars 
excluded, income remains significant. In addition, we also used more formal, 
econometric tests to check whether the endogeneity of income is likely to cause 
problems with the interpretation of the results obtained from our core model. Since 
there are no standard endogeneity tests for logit or probit models, we re-estimate our 
core regression as a linear probability model, a strategy previously employed by 
Miguel et al (2004), and instrument income. Our instruments for income are the 
distance from Washington D.C., access to the nearest sea port, and the proportion of 
the country that is located in the tropics. We do not have the values for the 
instrumental variables for all countries and our sample size is significantly reduced 
from 1063 to 911 observations. In order to compare our two stage regression results 
we present the linear probability model estimated on this reduced sample size in Table 
5, column 2. Compared with our core model primary commodity exports are not 
statistically significant.. A Hausman test suggests that income may be endogenous11 
and we present our two stage least squares results in Table 5, column 3. The Hansen 
test suggests that our instruments are valid (p=0.58). Instrumented income is 
significant at the five percent level and the coefficient point estimate is more than 
double than when income is uninstrumented. Further, all the other variables that were 
significant in the uninstrumented regression run on the restricted 911 observations 
remain significant when income is instrumented. To sum up, we find some evidence 
that income is endogenous but our instrumental variable results suggest that this is 
unlikely to mislead us in the interpretation of our results, since instrumented income 
has an even stronger impact on the risk of a civil war outbreak when compared with 
the non-instrumented model and no other variables lose significance.  
 
In column 4 we change the definition of the dependent variable to the new 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) by Gleditsch et al (2002). For this 
regression we make a corresponding change in our measure of the time since the 
previous civil war, basing the estimate on the ACD. Our results are very similar, 
growth, peace, population and fractionalization are significant, the proportion of 
young men in the society now becomes significant, while income and primary 
                                                 
11 Following Wooldridge (2002) we first regress income on all of the variables included in the core 
model and our three instruments. We then predict the residuals from this regression and include them in 
the core model. The coefficient on the residual is not significant (p=0.12). Thus, there is only weak 
evidence that income should be instrumented. 
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commodity exports lose significance but do not change sign. In column 5 we 
introduce fixed effects. This leads to a loss of observations; if countries had no time 
variation in the dependent variable, i.e. entirely peaceful countries, they are dropped 
from the sample. Time-invariant variables have to be omitted from this estimation. 
None of the variables that change slowly over time are significant but two time-
variant variables, growth and peace, are significant. The sixth column introduces 
random effects. The core results all remain significant. The seventh column introduces 
time dummies. These have little effect on the core results and only one of them is 
individually significant: there was a temporary increase in the risk of civil war in the 
first half of the 1990s. This provides some evidence for Kaplan’s ‘coming anarchy’ 
hypothesis which was published in 1994. Luckily, this turned out not to be a general 
post cold-war trend because the dummies for 1995-99 and 2000-04 are not 
statistically significant. In a further robustness check in column 8 we exclude 
countries if they were not fully independent at the start of the sub-period. We lose two 
wars (Angola and Mozambique’s war starts in the 1975-79 period) and a further 41 
peace observations. The results are now a little stronger than the ones obtained from  
our core model, all variables apart from mountains are now significant at conventional 
levels. In column 9 of Table 5 we make the standard adjustment for rare events (King 
and Zeng, 2001). This treatment strengthens our results. In column 10 we expand the 
sample to its maximum by using the AMELIA program of multiple imputation of all 
missing values of explanatory variables (King et al, 2001). This increases our 
coverage of civil wars from 71 to the full 84. Again, this seems to strengthen our 
results. The proportion of young men in the society is now significant at the one per 
cent level. The level of primary commodity exports is no longer significant, but its 
square term remains significant at the ten per cent level. This weaker result is most 
likely due to the characteristics of the previously omitted conflicts. Theytend to be in 
countries in which official data on exports radically underestimate actual transactions. 
For example, in Afghanistan and Cambodia, two of the omitted conflicts, there is 
considerable evidence that the conflict was financed partly by substantial illegal 
exports of drugs, gems and timber. Hence, the loss of significance for primary 





We now return to our core results and focus on the implications of the three new 
variables. The variables, countries under the French security umbrella, the proportion 
of young men in the population, and the proportion of the terrain which is 
mountainous, all have substantial effects. Consider two hypothetical countries whose 
characteristics were at the mean of all the other variables but which differed 
substantially in respect of these three. One was under the implicit French security 
umbrella, had only half the average proportion of young men in its society, and had no 
mountainous terrain. The other was not under the security umbrella, had double the 
average proportion of young men in its society, and was as mountainous as Nepal. 
The respective risks of civil war in these two otherwise identical societies are 0.6 per 
cent and 32.9 per cent. 
 
However, the key significance of these new variables is not that they have such 
substantial effects but that they are somewhat easier to interpret than any of the 
variables that were previously found to be significant. They are better proxies for 
distinguishing between the two key branches of the theoretical models: motivation 
versus feasibility. While the three economic variables, the level, growth and structure 
of income, can all be interpreted as either feasibility or motivation, the three new 
variables cannot so readily be interpreted as proxying motivation. By contrast, they all 
have very ready interpretations as important aspects of feasibility. The Francophone 
security guarantee made rebellion more dangerous and less likely to succeed. It was 
simply less militarily feasible. Mountainous terrain provides an obvious safe haven 
for rebel forces: it increases military feasibility. Finally, the proportion of young men 
in the society is a good proxy for the proportion of the population psychologically 
predisposed to violence and best-suited for rebel recruitment: again, it makes rebellion 
more feasible. The results are therefore consistent with the feasibility hypothesis.  
 
However, they are still not a fully convincing test of the hypothesis because two of 
them can also be interpreted as affecting the motivation for rebellion. Mountainous 
areas might be atypically poor, and so proxy wide regional inequalities. There is a 
long history of cities of the plains being attacked by the marches. Similarly, in 
societies with a high proportion of young men youth might be the victim of 
exploitation by older age groups. We have not, however, been able to think of an 
equivalent motivation-based account for the effect of La Francophonie. If the most 
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plausible interpretation of the importance of mountains and of the proportion of young 
men in the society is that they proxy important aspects of feasibility, then the results 
are powerful. By construction the two hypothetical countries are identical in respect of 
all other motivations for conflict, and differ only in these three aspects of feasibility. 
The implication would be that differences in feasibility are decisive for the risk of 
conflict.  
 
Two other variables are perhaps also most readily interpreted as proxying feasibility, 
although they could be interpreted in other ways. These are population size and 
primary commodity exports. The fact that the marginal effect of the log of population 
size is relatively small reflects scale economies in security provision and so proxies 
military feasibility. Primary commodity exports probably proxy the scope for rebel 
financial predation and so proxy financial feasibility. We conclude with a refinement 
of our two hypothetical countries in which these two variables are added as further 
differences. In the former, in which rebellion is already difficult, we set the population 
to be 50 million, and set primary commodity exports as a share of GDP to zero. Note 
that all these five features that make rebellion less feasible are within the observed 
range. All the other characteristics of the country are at the sample mean. In the other 
territory, in which rebellion is easy, there are five identical countries each with a 
population of 10 million. Each has primary commodity exports equal to 25 per cent of 
GDP and also the other three features that make rebellion easy, as specified 
previously. Other than these characteristics each is identical to the country in which 
rebellion is difficult. By design, each territory has the same total population although 
one is divided into five small countries, and the characteristics that might affect the 
motive for rebellion have been kept constant at the mean of all observations. What is 
the risk of civil war in each of these territories? In the territory in which rebellion is 
difficult the risk of civil war in any five-year period is now only 0.3 per cent. In other 
words, rebellion does not occur because it is infeasible. In the territory in which there 
are fewer impediments to rebellion the risk that a civil war will erupt somewhere in 
the territory is now an astonishing 99.8 per cent.12 Thus, where rebellion is feasible, it 
will occur without any special inducements in terms of motivation. While our five 
variables have broadly captured the important aspects of feasibility, namely finance, 
                                                 
12 In each small country separately it is 28.5. 
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military deterrence, and the availability of suitable recruits, we have not set up an 
extreme situation. For example, we have not introduced anything about the level or 
growth of per capita income, or about the time since a previous civil war. Low per 
capita income, slow growth, and the organizational and armaments legacies from a 
previous civil war all make rebellion more feasible even though they may also 
increase the motivation for rebellion. 
 
Thus, the new evidence goes considerably beyond supporting the key results of our 
previous work about the primacy of economic variables in the risk of civil war. While 
not decisive, it points clearly towards the proposition that feasibility rather than 
motivation is decisive for the risk of rebellion. 
 
There are, however, severe limits to what can be concluded from the regression 
analysis of global data sets. Our variables are proxies for concepts that could be much 
better measured by purpose-design field studies. Our analysis suggests the importance 
of causal processes about the conditions of viability for rebellion. Oyefusi (2007) 
provides detailed micro-evidence on rebel recruitment in the Niger delta. In this case 
study the decision to join seems to be determined by personal economic 
characteristics rather than by group grievances. However, what is needed are more 





In this paper we have analyzed empirically the causes of civil war. This is our third 
paper on the topic. Our first, (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) was the first quantitative 
study of the topic. Our second, (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) though a major advance 
on our first study, still omitted many civil wars and has been subject to considerable 
challenge and debate. We have attempted to make the results in this paper more 
definitive. The sample has nearly doubled to over 1,000 observations, the period of 
analysis has been brought up to end-2004, and the quality of the data has been 
considerably improved. Our results are important in two respects. First, despite the 
challenges, the core results of our previous analysis all survive. In particular, 
economic characteristics matter: namely, the level, growth and structure of income. 
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Secondly, two new variables are found to be both significant and quantitatively 
important. These are whether the country was under the implicit French security 
umbrella and the proportion of its population who were males in the age range 15-29. 
We also found some weaker evidence that mountainous countries are more conflict 
prone.  Not only are these three variables important in their own right, from our 
perspective their key significance is that for the first time variables are significant 
which can reasonably be interpreted in terms of the major theoretical divisions. As we 
discuss in our review of theory, the basic division between theories of civil war is 
those that focus on feasibility, and those which focus on motivation, which in turn has 
two variants, ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. The three new variables point to the primacy of 
feasibility over motivation, a result which is consistent with the feasibility hypothesis. 
The feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is feasible it will occur: 
motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be 
adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche, or itself 
endogenous to the opportunities thereby opened for illegal income. 
 
An implication of the feasibility hypothesis is that if the incidence of civil war is to be 
reduced, which seems appropriate given its appalling consequences, it will need to be 
made more difficult. This is orthogonal to the rectification of justified grievances, the 
case for which is implied directly by the concept of ‘justified grievance’ without any 
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Table 1: List of Civil Wars 
 
Country War  Country War  Country War  Country War 
Afghanistan 1978-2001  DRC 1960-1965  Liberia* 1989-1990  Serbia* 1991-1992 
Algeria 1962-1963  DRC*  1993  Liberia* 1992-1995  Serbia 1998-1999 
Algeria* 1992-2000  DRC* 1996-2000  Liberia* 1996  Sierra Leone* 1991-1996 
Angola* 1975-1991  CongoRep.* 1997-1999  Liberia 2003  Sierra Leone* 1998-2000 
Angola* 1992-1994  Côte d'Ivoire* 2002-ongoing  Mozambique* 1979-1992  Somalia* 1982-1997 
Angola* 1998-2001  Dom. Rep.* 1965  Myanmar* 1968-1980  South Africa* 1989-1993 
Azerbaijan 1991-1994  El Salvador* 1979-1992  Myanmar* 1983-1995  South Africa* 1999-2002 
Burundi* 1972  Ethiopia* 1974-1991  Nepal 2002-ongoing  Sri Lanka* 1971 
Burundi* 1988  Guatemala* 1966-1972  Nicaragua* 1978-1979  Sri Lanka* 1983-1993 
Burundi* 1991-1992  Guatemala* 1978-1984  Nicaragua* 1982-1990  Sri Lanka* 1995-2001 
Burundi 1993-1998  Guinea-Biss.* 1998  Nigeria* 1967-1970  Sudan 1963-1972 
Burundi 2000-2002  India* 1985-1993  Nigeria* 1980-1981  Sudan* 1983-1992 
Cambodia 1970-1975  India* 2002-ongoing  Nigeria 1984  Sudan* 1995-ongoing 
Cambodia 1978-1991  Indonesia 1956-1960  Pakistan* 1971  Thailand* 1970-1973 
Cambodia 1993-1997  Iran* 1978-1979  Pakistan 1973-1977  Turkey* 1991-2002 
Cameroon 1959-1961  Iran* 1981-1982  Pakistan* 1994-1995  Uganda 1966 
Chad* 1966-1971  Iraq 1961-1963  Peru* 1982-1995  Uganda* 1980-1988 
Chad 1980-1988  Iraq* 1974-1975  Philippines* 1972-1992  Uganda* 1996-2001 
Chad* 1990  Iraq* 1985-1993  Philippines* 2000-2001  Uganda* 2004- ongoing 
Chile* 1973  Iraq 1996  Romania* 1989  Vietnam 1960-1965 
China* 1967-1968  Jordan* 1970  Russia* 1994-1996  Yemen 1962-1969 
Colombia* 1984-1993  Lao PDR 1960-1962  Russia* 1998-ongoing  Yemen 1986 
Colombia* 1998-ongoing  Lao PDR 1963-1973  Rwanda 1963-1964  Yemen 1994 
   Lebanon 1975-1990  Rwanda* 1990-1993  Zimbabwe* 1972-1979 
      Rwanda 1994    
      Rwanda* 1998    
 
Note: Source Gleditsch (2004), war observations marked with an asterisk are included in our core model (Table 3, column 4). If two wars broke 
out in the same five year period we only coded one war start. 
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Table 2: Means of Key Variables 
 









0.067 0 1 0.037 
GDP per Capita 
(US $, base year 1997)  
5452 5764 1101 681 
GDP per Capita Growth (t-1) 
 
1.844 2.011 -0.486 0.204 
Primary Commodity Exports 
(proportion of GDP) 
0.164 0.165 0.146 0.178 
Years of Peace 
 
32 33 16 32 
Former French African Colony 
(dummy) 
0.101 0.104 0.056 1 
Social Fractionalisation 
(index 0-1) 
0.180 0.173 0.282 0.287 
Proportion of Young Men 
(proportion of age 15-29 in total population) 
0.129 0.129 0.133 0.128 
Total Population 
 
30.2 28.3 56.5 9.1 
Mountainous 
(proportion of total land area) 
15.779 15.442 20.484 4.538 
Number of observations 1063 992 71 107 
 
Note: Based on the sample used for our core model, Table 3, column 4.
 
Table 3: Feasibility of Civil War 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economy     
ln GDP per Capita -0.232 -0.233 -0.216 -0.216 
 (1.72)* (1.72)* (1.74)* (1.74)* 
GDP per Capita  -0.148 -0.147 -0.147 -0.144 
Growth (t-1) (3.69)*** (3.69)*** (3.69)*** (3.69)*** 
Primary Commodity  7.150 6.98 6.916 6.988 
Exports (PCE) (1.74)* (1.76)* (1.76)* (1.77)* 
PCE squared  -14.581 -14.245 -14.233 -14.438 
 (1.77)* (1.79)* (1.80)* (1.82)* 
     
History     
Post Cold War -0.135 -0.158 -0.138  
 (0.35) (0.45) (0.40)  
Previous War -0.082    
 (0.17)    
Peace -0.058 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 
 (3.78)*** (5.75)*** (5.77)*** (5.83)*** 
Former French -1.203 -1.201 -1.231 -1.221 
African Colony (1.95)* (1.94)* (2.02)** (2.00)** 
     
Social Characteristics     
Social  2.173 2.189 2.193 2.186 
Fractionalisation (2.68)*** (2.72)*** (2.72)*** (2.71)*** 
Proportion of  12.493 12.378 12.532 12.639 
Young Men (1.52) (1.51) (1.54) (1.55) p=0.12 
Ln Population 0.276 0.272 0.272 0.266 
 (2.72)*** (2.76)*** (2.76)*** (2.73)*** 
     
Geography     
Mountainous 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (1.48) (1.48) (1.46) (1.45) 
     
Polity     
Democracy 0.012 0.014   
 (0.27) (0.30)   
     
Observations 1063 1063 1063 1063 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Log Likelihood -188.66 -188.68 -188.72 -188.80 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war start. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions 
include an intercept (not reported). 
 
 34
Table 4: Specification Tests  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Economy        
ln GDP  -0.155 -0.149 -0.256 -0.211 -0.210 -0.219 -0.212 
per Capita (1.09) (1.05) (1.83)* (1.70)* (1.67)* (1.75)* (1.70)* 
GDP per Capita  -0.142 -0.143 -0.141 -0.142 -0.143 -0.142 -0.144 
Growth (t-1) (3.61)*** (3.63)*** (3.57)*** (3.66)*** (3.68)*** (3.64)*** (3.69)*** 
PCE  7.167 7.011 6.444 7.578 6.842 6.622 7.339 
 (1.80)* (1.78)* (1.63) (1.89)* (1.73)* (1.63) (1.80)* 
PCE squared  -14.536 -14.220 -13.584 -15.328 -14.239 -13.835 -14.766 
 (1.82)* (1.80)* (1.72)* (1.92)* (1.80)* (1.72)* (1.85)* 
Fuel exports       -0.002 
       (0.35) 
        
History        
Peace -0.056 -0.056 -0.054 -0.056 -0.056 -0.055 -0.056 
 (5.82)*** (5.83)*** (5.65)*** (5.84)*** (5.83)*** (5.81)*** (5.82)*** 
Former French -1.071 -1.340 -1.265 -1.144 -1.238 -1.254 -1.227 
African Colony (1.08) (2.17)** (2.06)** (1.87)* (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.01)** 
Former French  -0.268       
Colony (0.34)       
Years since   0.002     
Independence   (0.63)     
        
Social 
Character. 
       
Social 1.597 1.650 2.330 2.941 1.788 2.159 2.155 
Fractionalisation (1.63) (1.70)* (2.76)*** (2.41)** (1.50) (2.66)*** (2.66)*** 
Ethnic     0.372   
Fractionalisation     (0.45)   
Ethnic    -0.471    
Dominance    (0.82)    
Proportion of 12.896 13.021 13.138 13.450 12.650 12.984 12.721 
Young Men (1.60) (1.62) (1.61) (1.63) (1.54) (1.58) (1.55) 
ln Population 0.302 0.304 0.213 0.268 0.256 0.263 0.271 
 (2.83)*** (2.84)*** (1.95)* (2.76)*** (2.57)** (2.70)*** (2.73)*** 
        
Geography        
Mountainous 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (1.52) (1.56) (1.14) (1.46) (1.45) (1.38) (1.47) 
Sub Saharan 0.445 0.463      
Africa (0.95) (0.99)      
Population       -0.000  
Density      (0.32)  
        
Observations 1063 1063 996 1063 1063 1063 1063 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Log Likelihood -188.25 -188.31 -187.95 -188.47 -188.70 -188.72 -188.74 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war start. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions 




Table 5: Further Robustness Checks (continues on the next page) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











Economy       
ln GDP per Capita -0.311 -0.011 -0.025 -0.117 -0.635 -0.221 
 (2.06)** (1.90)* (2.12)** (0.79) (1.39) (1.75)* 
GDP per Capita  -0.075 -0.011 -0.010 -0.157 -0.220 -0.144 
Growth (t-1) (1.41) (4.55)*** (4.28)*** (3.40)*** (3.55)*** (3.67)*** 
PCE  5.263 0.156 0.097 4.386 8.087 7.104 
 (1.16) (0.87) (0.54) (0.95) (1.61) (1.78)* 
PCE squared  -10.157 -0.307 -0.207 -9.729 -13.154 -14.596 
 (1.16) (1.20) (0.81) (1.11) (1.01) (1.82)* 
       
History       
Peace -0.006 -0.004 0.004 -0.060 0.068 -0.058 
 (0.47) (6.14)*** (5.77)*** (5.01)*** (3.43)*** (5.68)*** 
Former French -1.252 -0.086 -0.108 -1.191 -16.206 -1.235 
African Colony (1.58) (3.39)*** (3.31)*** (1.47) (0.01) (1.99)** 
       
Social 
Characteristics 
      
Social  1.621 0.186 0.153 1.907  2.203 
Fractionalisation (1.56) (3.07)*** (2.26)** (1.96)**  (2.68)*** 
Proportion of  14.526 0.375 0.302 15.589 -37.337 12.463 
Young Men (1.63)* (0.90) (0.72) (1.66)** (1.56) (1.51) 
ln Population 0.232 0.014 0.012 0.257 0.892 0.273 
 (1.99)** (2.59)** (2.14)* (2.07)** (1.50) (2.75)*** 
       
Geography       
Mountainous 0.013 0.003 0.0001 0.005  0.011 
 (1.48) (0.62) (0.20) (0.54)  (1.44) 
Observations 1026 911 911 1045 242 1063 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.25   
Log Likelihood -132.36   -134.43 -70.74 -188.89 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war start. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions 
include an intercept (not reported). 
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Table 5b: Further Robustness Checks (continuation from the previous page) 
 








Economy     
ln GDP per Capita -0.211 -0.237 -0.209 -0.255 
 (1.69)* (1.89)* (2.05)* (2.22)** 
GDP per Capita  -0.145 -0.126 -0.141 -0.083 
Growth (t-1) (3.40)*** (3.20)*** (4.29)*** (2.74)*** 
PCE  6.737 6.847 5.980 1.743 
 (1.69)* (1.71)* (1.62)* (0.858) 
PCE squared  -13.96 -14.304 -11.854 -3.671* 
 (1.74)* (1.77)* (1.63)* (1.31) 
     
History     
Peace -0.058 -0.057 -0.053 -0.059 
 (5.84)*** (5.90)*** (5.51)*** (6.50)*** 
Former French -1.230 -1.259 -1.095 -0.873 
African Colony (2.01)* (2.05)** (1.89)* (1.517)* 
     
Social 
Characteristics 
    
Social  2.157 2.084 2.140 2.001 
Fractionalisation (2.64)*** (2.55)*** (2.80)*** (2.81)*** 
Proportion of  12.676 13.659 13.274 18.59 
Young Men (1.53) (1.66)* (1.70)** (3.15)*** 
ln Population 0.262 0.225 0.254 0.316 
 (2.61)*** (2.26)** (3.14)*** (3.89)*** 
     
Geography     
Mountainous 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.006 
 (1.47) (1.40) (1.46) (1.20) 
Time dummy  0.798    
1970-1974 (1.49)    
Time dummy  0.230    
1975-1979 (0.39)    
Time dummy  0.732    
1980-1984 (1.32)    
Time dummy  0.158    
1985-1989 (0.25)    
Time dummy  1.038    
1990-1994 (1.84)*    
Time dummy  0.452    
1995-1999 (0.78)    
Time dummy  0.260    
2000-2004 (0.40)    
     
Observations 1063 1020 1063 1472 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.27  0.27-0.31 
Log Likelihood -185.82 -183.11  -222.6 -236.0 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war start. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions 





We measure democracy with the democracy indicator from the Polity IV data set. It 




Using World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) data for GDP per capita we 
calculated the annual growth rates (World Bank, 2006). 
  
Former French African Colony 
This dummy takes a value of one for the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo. This variable is 
zero for all countries for the last period 2000-04. 
 
GDP per capita 
We measure GDP per capita annually. Data are measured in constant 1995 US dollars 
and the data source is World Bank, 2006. 
  
Peace 
The number of years since the end of the last civil war. If the country never 
experienced a civil war we count all years since the end of World War II. 
 
Population 
Population measures the total population, in our regressions we take the natural 
logarithm. Data source: World Bank, 2006.  
 
Primary Commodity Exports 
The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural 
resources. The data on primary commodity exports and GDP were obtained from the 
World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current US dollars. 
 
Social, ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization 
We proxy social fractionalization in a combined measure of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals from a given country do not speak the same language. The religious 
fractionalization index measures this probability for different religious affiliations. 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 1. A value of zero indicates that the 
society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 1 would characterize a 
completely heterogeneous society. We calculated our social fractionalization index as 
the product of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization and the religious fractionalization. 




Our main measure is based on Gleditsch (2004) and can be downloaded from 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/expwar.html (12 July 2006). Our alternative measure 
comes from the Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al 2002) and can be found on 
http://www.prio.no/page/CSCW_research_detail/Programme_detail_CSCW/9649/459
25.html (12 July 2006). 
 
Young Men 
We define this variable as the proportion of young men aged 15-49 of the total 
population (%).  Data Source: UN Demographic Yearbook 2005 
 
 
